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Abstract 
Studies on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are abundant in the 
literature.  But most researchers have examined GATT’s impact on economic activities with 
scant or no attention given to its impact on institutions such as market integration and efficiency.  
To the latter issues, this paper is addressed. 
Even prior to the signing of the final act, questions were raised on possible maneuvers that 
might frustrate its intent, that of ushering in an era of true liberalization in agricultural trade.  
This study finds consistent evidence that GATT reforms promoted market integration and 
improved market efficiency. 
Decomposition of price variability into its various sources shows that the transmission of 
shocks becomes more widespread across markets and is much faster under the GATT regime.  
This, in turn, suggests improved market integration.  The share of unexpected shocks originating 
from other prices in the variability of U.S. beef prices increased under GATT from 15 to 30 
percent, 14 to 46 percent for Australian beef prices, 20 to 43 percent for U.S. wheat prices, and 
19 to 54 percent for Australian wheat prices.  Also, cointegration analysis shows significant 
improvement in market efficiency particularly in the speed at which a market adjusts to 
departures from its long-run equilibrium.  Within the Pacific beef market the speed of adjustment 
increased under GATT from 0.309 to 0.609; between the Pacific beef and the Atlantic beef 
market the speed of adjustment increased from 0.246 to 0.592; and the wheat market speed of 
adjustment increased from 0.064 to 0.414. 
 
Key Words: market integration, market efficiency, cointegration, vector autoregression, GATT, 
beef and wheat markets. 
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Introduction 
The historic Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) accomplished what has 
eluded the GATT for a long time, that of putting agricultural trade under the same umbrella as 
that of other sectors (e.g., manufacturing).  In particular, it aimed to dismantle trade-distorting 
policies through the introduction of disciplines that included ensuring and expanding market 
access, and limiting domestic support and export subsidy. 
Even prior to the signing of the Final ACT, questions were raised concerning the wide 
latitude in the rules of implementation stipulated in the URAA.  These rules are open to 
maneuvers that might frustrate the intent of ushering in an era of true liberalization in 
agricultural trade.  The six-year implementation period is about to close, and with the revisitation 
just a year away, the GATT compliance record so far is mixed at best.  For example, although 
tariffication agreements converted all non-tariff barriers (NTBs) into tariff equivalents that were 
to be cut by 24 to 36 percent, and Minimum Access Volume (MAV) insured access at a 
minimum of 3 to 5 percent of base consumption, “dirty tariffication” limited the reduction in 
effective protection.  Table 1, reproduced from Ingco (1995), shows that for several countries the 
URAA ad-valorem rate for 1995 in wheat and beef are even higher than the estimated ad-
valorem rate for the base period 1986-98.  Although Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) 
declined by 40 percent, which is much higher than the 13 to 20 percent required in the URAA, 
support under the “green-box” policies (not subject to reduction commitments under GATT) 
increased by 54 percent.  Although countries made an export subsidy reduction commitment of 
14 to 21 percent, strong prices in 1995 and 1996 made them redundant.  With all these 
shortcomings, did GATT make any difference in agricultural trade at all? 
Studies on the impact of GATT are abundant in the literature.  However, they have mostly 
focused on the impact of GATT on economic activities such as production, consumption, trade, 
and prices, using either a general equilibrium model such as GTAPP or partial equilibrium 
agricultural trade models of the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics (ABARE).  For 
example, Veeman (1994), Brester and Wohlgennant (1997), Marsh (1997), and Fuller and Hayes 
(1998) examined the impact of GATT on price levels of traded agricultural commodities.  Fausti 
12  /  Fabiosa 
and Qasmi (1998) examined changes in trade patterns with GATT, while Borges (1995), Song 
and Carter (1996), and Gunter, Jeong, and White (1996) examined the welfare implications of 
GATT.  However, very scant attention has been given on the impact of GATT in improving the 
functioning of institutions such as the world agricultural commodity markets.  The reforms 
introduced by GATT are institutional in nature (i.e., changes on “rules of the game”).  The 
impact on economic activities in some sense is secondary since the institutional change aspect of 
GATT precedes them. 
This study examines whether GATT reforms improved market integration and efficiency, 
using the beef and wheat markets as specific cases.  Market integration is defined similar to 
McNew and Fackler (1997), that is, in terms of the degree that shocks arising in one market price 
are passed on to other market prices.  On the other hand, the concept of market efficiency is more 
narrowly defined in terms of the speed at which market prices adjust to departures from their 
equilibrium relationship. 
The world beef market is used as a specific case because the pre-GATT regime of beef trade 
that was subject to reforms under the URAA, had been highly protected by measures that 
impeded market integration and efficiency.  In particular, access to beef markets was expanded 
and ensured through tariff rate quotas (TRQ).  That is, for countries with significant beef 
imports, current access commitments required them to grant market access opportunities on 
terms and at levels no less than the average quantities imported during the base period (1986 to 
1988).  For countries with minimal beef imports, minimum access opportunities set the level of 
market access at 3 percent of average consumption in the base period, and to grow to 5 percent 
throughout the implementation period. 
Imports within the TRQs are charged a low or minimal in-quota rate that is not to exceed 32 
percent of their bound tariff commitments.  Table 2 shows that the total initial TRQ in beef is 
1.161 million metric tons (mmt) and grows to 1.301 mmt at the end of the implementation 
period.  This market access represents 23.93 percent of the 1994 world beef trade.  The TRQ in 
beef exceeded that of pork, which was at 10.67 percent, both in terms of the level of the TRQ 
and the TRQ expressed as a proportion of total trade.  Moreover, the URAA commitments 
reduce the maximum amount of allowable subsidized beef exports from 1.513 mmt to 1.129 
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mmt, representing 31.20 percent of trade (see table 3).  In terms of its proportion to world trade, 
the allowable subsidized export in beef is smaller than that of pork, which is at 38.18 percent. 
Figure 1 shows the final bound rate in beef for selected countries.  Sixteen percent of 
countries had a final bound rate of less than 15 percent, 42 percent had a final bound rate of 15 to 
50 percent, 21 percent had a final bound rate of 50 to 100 percent, and 21 percent had a final 
bound rate of more than 100 percent.  The wheat market is used to examine whether the same 
pattern of institutional impact in meat can be observed for crops.  Wheat is a highly traded 
commodity with world trade representing 20 percent of world wheat production.  Moreover, 
similar to beef, the pre-GATT period wheat trade was subject to substantial distortion, with 
subsidized wheat exports representing 47 percent of total trade.  The URAA reduces the 
maximum allowable subsidized wheat export by 31 percent at the end of the implementation 
period. 
The URAA disciplines radically changed domestic and trade policies of several countries 
that are significant players in the world beef market.  The European Union (EU), the fourth 
largest beef importer after the United States, Japan, and Russia, and the third largest beef 
exporter after Australia and the United States, ended its variable levy in beef.  The EU allowed a 
TRQ of 161 thousand metric tons (tmt) at an in-quota rate of 20 percent and limited its export 
subsidy to 822 until 2000.  The United States replaced its quota under the Meat Import Law with 
a TRQ of 656.621 tmt.  Japan abolished the beef import quota in a 1990 agreement and replaced 
its base rate of 93 percent with a bound rate of 50 percent, in 1995.  This is set to further decline 
to 38.5 in the year 2000.  Mexico, the sixth largest importer, has liberalized its imports of 
fresh/chilled/frozen beef since January 1994 according to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).  Full liberalization of beef variety meats will follow by 2003.  Although 
South Korea, the seventh largest importer, is fully liberalizing only its beef imports by 2001, the 
share of the more market-oriented Simultaneous Buy-Sell (SBS) system is increasing—expected 
to capture 70 percent of South Korea’s 206 tmt import quota this year. 
Another feature of the world beef market that impeded market efficiency is its segmentation 
into the Pacific and Atlantic beef markets, where the latter represents beef trade among countries 
where foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is endemic.  While countries with FMD are able to import 
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from countries without FMD, they could not export frozen, fresh, and chilled beef products to 
FMD-free countries. 
Australia and the United States are major players in the Pacific market, while Argentina and 
the EU are the major players in the Atlantic market.  Table 4 shows that the imports of countries 
in the Pacific beef market are solely sourced from within that market, while imports of some 
countries in the Atlantic beef market are partially sourced from outside.  Except for Argentina, 
exports of the Atlantic beef market are to countries within that market.  Argentina (and maybe 
Brazil) export processed beef to the Pacific beef market.  Australia and New Zealand export to 
countries in the Atlantic market. 
The major change in the wheat market was the limit imposed on subsidized EU wheat 
exports.  From the high EU wheat export of 20 mmt in the early 1990s (with a large portion 
subsidized), it had to operate within the maximum allowable subsidized wheat export of 16.8 
mmt in 1998/98. 
Model 
This methodology of study departs from earlier studies on the GATT.  Whereas earlier 
studies had to specify some general or partial equilibrium structure, this study employs time 
series methods with minimum structural specifications and allows the associative behavior (i.e., 
correlation structure) of the data to “speak-for-itself.” 
Several studies have used the concept of cointegration to test for market integration: 
Goodwin (1992), Goodwin and Grennes (1994), Benson et al. (1994), and Silvapulle and 
Jayasuriya (1994).  McNew and Fackler (1997), however, questioned the appropriateness of the 
use of the presence and number of linear long-run relationship of a cointegrating vector as an 
indicator of market integration.  This study uses innovation accounting to directly measure 
market integration.  This method allows direct measurement of price variability and its 
decomposition to the various sources of variability from the variability of all other prices in the 
system.  The test for market efficiency is based on the speed of adjustment and the elasticity 
implied in the cointegrating vector.  
 
Dynamic price behavior of a given market can be represented by [1]  
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where Yt is a vector of endogenous prices; N is the lag length; Bi is a conformable coefficient 
matrix; and µt is a vector of primitive exogenous disturbances with distribution µ ~ N[0, Σ].  To 
avoid identification problems, the Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model is used as a reduced 
form of [1], i.e., 
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There are three possible reformulations of the VAR model in [2] to adequately handle the 
particular stationarity property of a given price vector Yt.  To choose the appropriate model, 
consider a reparameterized version equivalent to [2], i.e., 
[3] tt
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where Γi = f(Ci) and Ψ = ( I - C1 - C2 - . . . - CN ). 
If the rank of Ψis full, then using levels in [2] presents no statistical problem.  On the other 
hand, if the rank of  Ψ is zero then a different version of [2] is adequate.  However, if the rank of 
Ψ is 0 < r < N then the ECM in [3] is the appropriate model.  The dynamic relationship of prices 
is fully captured by the three terms of the RHS of [3].  Moreover, the specification lends easily to 
disaggregating the impact of fundamentals on the level of prices and impact of unexpected 
shocks on price variability.  The impact of fundamentals on the level of prices is captured in the 
long-run relationship represented by 1−Ψ tY .  The parameter ψ can be expressed as βα ′=Ψ , 
where β′ is the cointegrating vector such that β′Yt-1 (i.e., equilibrium error) is stationary, and α 
measures the speed of adjustment from past equilibrium errors. 
On the other hand, the impact of unexpected shocks on the variability of prices is captured 
by the innovation vector υt.  Consider a VMAR representation of the VAR, i.e., 
[4] Y F Lt t= ( )ν , 
16  /  Fabiosa 
where L is a lag operator, F L I C L L G( ) [ ( ) ]= − −1  and  ν υt tG=
−1
.  G is the Choleski 
decomposition of Σ.  An ith equation of [4] is  
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The total variability of the price vector can now be decomposed into its various sources.  
The unconditional variance of yit can be easily derived from (5), i.e., 
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where σi2 is the variance of the innovation of the i
th variable.  Let Pr(Y I(T-r)) be the optimum 
r-step-ahead predictor of Y given all information up to T-r.  Based on equation [5], the forecast 
for the ith good is  
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Then the forecast error is the difference between (5) and (7), i.e., 
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The forecast error is really a truncated version of VMAR itself.  It is for this reason that the 
variability of yit can also be examined in terms of the forecast error variance, which is equal to 
[9] 
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This expression is standardized in [10] to facilitate interpretation and comparison. 
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Each RHS term captures the proportion of the variability of yi due to the respective 
variability of the variables in the vector. 
In a VAR model, all variables are treated as endogenous.  If this is true, the data should be 
able to indicate their endogeneity.  That is, a variable whose variability is explained largely by 
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endogenous.  As a corollary, a variable that explains a large proportion of its own variability is a 
likely candidate to be classified as an exogenous variable.  That is, the sum f jii i
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be large. 
Empirical Implementation and Results 
Data used in this study are monthly beef and wheat prices from the International Financial 
Statistics covering the period June 1986 to April 1998.  Beef prices are for frozen beef in U.S. 
dollars per pound.  The U.S. beef price is FOB New York, while Australia and Argentina beef 
price are cost of insurance and freight (CIF) in U.S. East Coast ports.  Wheat prices are in U.S. 
dollars per bushel.  The U.S. wheat price is hard red winter wheat, FOB Gulf of Mexico ports, 
while Australia wheat price is Wheat Board export price.  All estimation was done using 
Regression Analysis of Time Series (RATS) for Windows version 4.3. 
The price variables were first tested for nonstationarity to select the most appropriate 
representation of the model.  The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF) is used for this purpose.  
Each price series is assumed to have a data generating process that is adequately described by a 
univariate version of model [3] with varying assumptions about the intercept and trend.  Table 5 
shows that the all the price series for beef and wheat are nonstationary.  That is, since in many of 
the cases the absolute values of the test statistics are lower than the critical values at 10 percent 
significant level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity.  This means that the 
individual price series can wander away with no tendency to revert to their mean.  However, 
there may be an equilibrium relationship that governs their comovements over time such that 
departures from this equilibrium condition are temporary.  This might occur because economic 
forces at play provide an internal tendency for these variables to revert to their equilibrium level. 
The existence of an equilibrium relationship of beef prices and wheat prices was first 
examined by testing for the presence of a linear combination of the prices that are stationary 
using the Johansen Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace of Stochastic Matrix method.  The Pacific 
beef market price equilibrium was tested for the U.S. and Australian beef price.  Table 6 shows 
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that the Johansen test suggests two cointegrating vectors between the Australian and U.S. beef 
price in the pre-GATT period and one cointegrating vector in the post-GATT period.  The 
Pacific-Atlantic beef market price equilibrium was tested for the Australian and Argentinean 
beef price.  The Johansen test suggests one cointegrating vector between the Australian and 
Argentinean beef price in the pre-GATT period and two cointegrating vectors in the post-GATT 
period.  The same result is shown for the long-run relationship of the Australian and U.S. wheat 
prices.  Since the result on the number of cointegrating vectors is mixed for the pre-GATT and 
post-GATT period, the study proceeded by imposing only one cointegrating vector in all cases. 
Very strong evidence was found that GATT disciplines promoted market efficiency in both 
the world beef and wheat markets, despite reported maneuvers that frustrated the true intent of 
the URAA.  Table 7 shows that within the Pacific market, the fundamental relationship of 
Australia and U.S. beef price significantly improved with the long-run transmission elasticity 
implied in the cointegrating vector increasing from 0.243 in the pre-GATT period to 0.289 in the 
post-GATT period.  More importantly, however, is the significant improvement in the speed of 
adjustment, which increased from 0.309 to 0.609, respectively.  That is, whenever the U.S. and 
Australia beef prices depart from their long-run equilibrium relationship, the Pacific beef market 
becomes more efficient under the GATT regime in the sense that the speed of adjustments back 
toward an equilibrium have doubled under the post-GATT regime.  Also, this speed of 
adjustment parameter is very significant with a t-ratio of 4.  Even the fundamental relationship of 
beef prices between the segmented Pacific and Atlantic markets improved significantly. 
In the pre-GATT period, the trade policy distortions and segmentation of the market may 
have corrupted the price transmission between the two markets at -0.065.  GATT reforms 
corrected this inverse relationship with a price transmission elasticity of 0.07, and increased the 
speed of adjustment by 2.4 times from 0.246 to 0.592.  The lower transmission elasticity under 
GATT within the Pacific-Atlantic beef market compared to within the Pacific market may be 
explained by the continuing segmentation of the two markets.  This trend may have been 
strengthened under the GATT agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  However, the 
increasing across-market beef trade between the United States and Russian Federation, Argentina 
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and the United States in more recent years may explain the significant improvement in the speed 
of adjustment. 
The same results in the beef market are repeated in the wheat market.  That is, the 
fundamental relationship of the Australia and the U.S. wheat price significantly improved with 
the long-run transmission elasticity implied in the cointegrating vector increasing from 1.020 in 
the pre-GATT period to 1.075 in the GATT period.  The speed of adjustment also increased from 
0.064 to 0.414. 
Furthermore, the variance decomposition analysis shows that there is a greater degree of 
market integration in the post-GATT period as evidenced by the more widespread and faster 
transmission of price variability across prices in both the beef and wheat markets.  The long-run 
maximum proportion of the variability of the U.S. beef price (explained by unexpected shocks to 
the Australian beef price) has increased from 14.53 percent in the pre-GATT regime to 25.95 
percent in the post-GATT regime (see table 8 and figure 2).  Moreover, the speed at which the 
unexpected shocks to the Australian beef price are reflected in the variability of the U.S. beef 
price has improved significantly under the GATT regime.  Whereas the maximum share of 14 
percent is not reached until the tenth-step-ahead-forecast in the pre-GATT regime, the maximum 
share of 25 percent in the post-GATT regime is already reached as early as the second-step-
ahead-forecast.  Also, the long-run maximum proportion of the variability of the Australia beef 
price that is explained by the unexpected shocks of the U.S. beef price increased from 14.52 
percent in the pre-GATT regime to 45.93 percent in the post-GATT regime (see table 8 and 
figure 3).  However, the speed at which the unexpected shocks to the Australian beef price are 
reflected in the variability of the U.S. beef price has slightly slowed down from 100 percent of 
the maximum share reached in the fifth-step-ahead-forecast in the pre-GATT regime to only 90 
percent in the post-GATT regime.  The same significant improvement in the transmission of 
price variability can be observed in the case of wheat price. 
The maximum share of shocks to the Australia wheat price to the variability of the U.S. 
wheat price doubled from 20 percent in the pre-GATT regime to 43 percent in the post-GATT 
regime (see table 9 and figure 4).  The same can be said for the maximum share of shocks to the 
U.S. wheat price on the variability of the Australia wheat price, which more than doubled from 
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19 to 46 percent (see table 9 and figure 5).  Whereas the maximum share is attained slowly in the 
pre-GATT regime for both prices, the post-GATT regime shows faster transmission of price 
shocks in the wheat market. 
A slightly different interpretation of the variance decomposition analysis shows that there is 
more price simultaneity under the GATT regime, suggesting better integration of markets in both 
beef and wheat.  In the pre-GATT regime, 85 percent of the variability of the U.S. and Australia 
beef price were explained by their own variability.  This own-share decreased to 74 and 54 
percent, respectively, in the post-GATT regime.  It is also shown that while their degree of 
exogeneity was almost the same in the pre-GATT regime, the Australia beef price became more 
endogenous in the post-GATT regime.  This is consistent to the fact that Australia can be 
considered as the residual supplier of beef in the world with a share of 43 percent of total world 
net beef trade in 1998.  Australia’s beef net export in 1998 was 1187 tmt compared to a net 
import of 205 tmt for the United States. 
The same pattern is repeated in the case of wheat, where in the pre-GATT regime, 80 and 81 
percent of the U.S. and Australia wheat price, respectively, were explained by their own 
variability.  Both prices showed greater endogeneity in the post-GATT regime, with the share of 
their own variability accounting only for 57 and 54 percent of their respective variability. 
Summary and Conclusion 
While the GATT revisitation is just a year away, questions are raised on the impact of 
GATT due to implementation maneuvers that might have frustrated the true intent of the 
disciplines. 
This study departs from the abundant studies on GATT in both subject matter and 
methodology.  Whereas earlier studies examined the impact of GATT mostly on economic 
activities, this study focused on the institutional impact of GATT, particularly on market 
integration and efficiency.  Whereas earlier studies had to specify general or partial equilibrium 
structure in their models, this study used time series methods with minimum structural 
specification.  
The world beef and wheat markets are used as specific cases to examine the impact of 
GATT reforms on market integration and efficiency.  Major importers and exporters of beef 
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were significantly impacted by the GATT reforms.  The TRQ in beef represents 23.93 percent of 
world trade and is higher than that of pork and poultry.  On the other hand, the volume of 
maximum allowable subsidized beef export is 31.20 percent of trade compared to 38.18 percent 
for pork.  In the case of wheat, the level of maximum subsidized export representing 47 percent 
of world trade is reduced by 31 percent.  
The impact of GATT on market integration and efficiency was analyzed using cointegration 
and innovation accounting to capture the degree and speed of transmission of shocks in both the 
fundamental variables and innovations. 
An ADF test showed that all the beef and wheat prices are nonstationary.  The cointegration 
test suggests that a long-run equilibrium exists for beef prices within the Pacific beef market, 
between the Pacific and Atlantic beef market, and the wheat market.  The study found very 
strong evidence that GATT disciplines promoted market efficiency in both the world beef and 
wheat markets. 
Long-run price transmission elasticity increased and the speed at which the market adjusted 
to departures from its long-run equilibrium more than doubled under the GATT regime.  Within 
the Pacific market price, transmission elasticity between Australian and U.S. beef prices 
improved and adjustment toward equilibrium is much faster under the GATT regime.  Between 
the Pacific and Atlantic beef market, GATT reforms corrected the corrupt (inverse) relationship 
between the Australian and Argentine beef prices, and increased the speed of adjustment.  The 
same improvement in the price transmission elasticity and speed of adjustment is shown in the 
case of wheat. 
Variance decomposition shows better market integration under the GATT regime, with more 
widespread and faster transmission of unexpected shocks across different prices in both the beef 
and wheat markets. 
Furthermore, the variance decomposition suggests that with better market integration under 
the GATT regime, prices exhibit more simultaneity.  That is, under GATT, a larger proportion of 
price variability is explained by shocks in other prices in the market than own shocks.  This is 
particularly true for the Australian beef price since Australia can be considered the residual 
supplier of beef in the world. 
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Table 1.  Percentage comparison of estimated ad-valorem tariff equivalent, 1986-88 and tariffs 
   declared in country schedules 
 Wheat Beef 
 1986-88 UR Base Change 1986-88 UR Base Change 
Industrial       
   Australia 0.7 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Canada 30.0 57.7 27.7 2.0 38.0 36.0 
   United States 20.0 6.0 -14.0 3.0 31.0 28.0 
   EU12 103.0 155.6 52.6 83.0 125.4 42.4 
   Japan 651.0 239.6 -411.4 87.0 38.5 -48.5 
   New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Australia 188.0 400.0 212.0 79.0 239.0 160.0 
   Finland 239.0 352.0 113.0 193.3 394.0 200.7 
   Norway 266.0 495.0 229.0 145.0 405.0 260.0 
   Switzerland 245.0 179.0 -66.0 236.0 479.0 243.0 
   Turkey 36.0 200.0 164.0 -4.4 250.0 254.4 
         
Developing         
   Mexico -1.0 74.0 75.0 41.6 50.0 8.4 
   Columbia 20.0 138.0 118.0  120.0  
   Venezuela  130.0   50.0  
   Thailand  64.0   60.0  
   South Africa 10.3 74.5 64.2  210.0  
   Indonesia  30.0   70.0  
   South Korea  10.9  95.5 44.5 -51.0 
   Morocco 14.0 224.0 210.0  315.0  
   Czech Rep -38.0 16.0 54.0 134.0 43.0 -91.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  GATT tariff quota 
   Change  
Commodity Initial TRQ Final TRQ Absolute Percent Percent of Trade 
  
(million metric tons) 
   Beef      1,160,619       1,301,034       140,415 12.10 23.93 
   Pork         192,207          346,406       154,199 80.23 10.67 
   Poultry         195,162          247,497         52,335 26.82 6.18 
   Mutton         286,578          289,854           3,276 1.14 37.27 
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Table 3.  GATT maximum allowable subsidized export 
 
Commodity 
Initial Max  
Sub Export 
Final Max 
Sub Export 
 
Change 
Percent 
Change 
Percent of 
Trade 
  
(thousand metric tons) 
Meat      
   Beef 1,513       1,129      (384) -25.38 31.20 
   Pork 688          560      (127) -18.55 38.18 
   Poultry         802          594      (208) -25.90 25.39 
   Mutton           28            23         (4) -15.79 3.68 
Wheat 56,940 39,413 (17,528) -30.78 46.5 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Share of exports and imports to countries in the same market segment 
 Export Import 
Market Share (%) Volume (tmt) Share (%) Volume (tmt)
Atlantic Market 
   Argentina 82.76 470
   Brazil 94.64 43 98.26 144
   China 99.00 29 0.88 3
   Czech republic 100.00 2 100.00 4
   European Union 99.87 784 93.59 281
   Hong Kong 100.00 3 53.29 35
   India 99.09 165
   Indonesia 8.17 5
   Philippines 61.14 59
   Poland 100.00 28
   Romania 100.00 1
   Russia 99.51 550
Pacific Market 
   Australia 90.56 678 100.00 4
   Canada 99.57 241
   Japan 100.00 648
   Mexico 100.00 0 100.00 96
   New Zealand  94.41 344
   Taiwan 100.00 60
   South Korea 99.97 140
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Table 5. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
 α0=αT=0 α0≠0, αT=0 α0≠0, αT≠0 
 Test Stat Cri Val Test Stat Cri Val Test Stat Cri Val 
Beef Price       
   United States 0.536 -1.942 -3.759 -2.882 -3.389 -3.442 
   Australia -0.552 -1.942 -0.542 -2.882 -2.064 -3.442 
   Argentina 0.642 -1.945 -1.349 -2.904 -1.352 -3.476 
       
Wheat Price       
   United States -0.629 -1.941 -3.552 -2.870 -3.489 -3.425 
   Australia -0.321 -1.941 -2.901 -2.870 -2.987 -3.425 
   Argentina -0.351 -1.941 -2.788 -2.875 -2.908 -3.431 
 
 
Table 6. Johansen Cointegration test 
 Maximal Eigenvalue Trace of Stochastic Matrix 
Null and Alternative Test Stat Critical Value Test Stat Critical Value 
Pacific Beef Market 
   AU-US Pre-GATT 
      0 vs 1 18.370 10.600 24.000 13.310 
      1 vs 2  5.630 2.710 5.630 2.710 
     
   AU-US Post-GATT     
      0 vs 1 20.870 10.600 23.160 13.310 
      1 vs 2  2.290 2.710 2.290 2.710 
 
Pacific-Atlantic Beef Market 
   AU-AR Pre-GATT     
      0 vs 1 20.870 10.600 23.160 13.310 
      1 vs 2  2.290 2.710 2.290 2.710 
     
   AU-AR Post-GATT     
      0 vs 1 15.650 10.600 20.290 13.310 
      1 vs 2  4.640 2.710 4.640 2.710 
     
Wheat Market     
   AU-US Pre-GATT     
      0 vs 1 9.870 7.370 9.900 10.350 
      1 vs 2  0.030 2.980 0.030 2.980 
     
   AU-US Post-GATT     
      0 vs 1 22.100 7.370 29.840 10.350 
      1 vs 2  7.740 2.980 7.740 2.980 
Significance level at 10 percent 
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Table 7.  Long-run relationship and speed of adjustment 
 Pre-GATT GATT 
Variables Long-run Speed Long-run Speed 
Pacific Beef Market     
   AU-US Beef Price 0.243 0.309 
4.288 
0.289 0.609 
4.082 
Atlantic Beef Market   
   AU-AR Beef Price -0.065 0.246 
4.215 
0.070 0.592 
4.030 
Wheat Market 
   AU-US Wheat Price 1.020 0.064 
1.161 
1.075 0.414 
2.845 
 
 
Table 8. Variance decomposition for the beef market  
 Pre-GATT GATT 
 US Beef Price 
Variability 
AU Beef Price 
Variability 
US Beef Price 
Variability 
AU Beef Price 
Variability 
 
Step 
US 
Price 
AU 
Price 
US 
Price 
AU 
Price 
US 
Price 
AU 
Price 
US 
Price 
AU 
Price 
1 100.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 
2 95.799 4.201 0.038 99.962 77.135 22.865 2.669 97.331 
3 95.557 4.443 2.872 97.128 74.111 25.889 11.524 88.476 
4 95.003 4.997 6.288 93.712 74.976 25.024 11.609 88.391 
5 94.627 5.373 6.425 93.575 72.883 27.117 14.132 85.868 
6 94.204 5.796 10.454 89.546 75.183 24.817 14.058 85.942 
7 88.390 11.611 12.904 87.096 75.074 24.926 23.343 76.657 
8 86.627 13.373 13.146 86.854 74.769 25.231 33.868 66.132 
9 86.789 13.211 13.107 86.893 74.462 25.538 33.719 66.281 
10 85.977 14.023 13.898 86.102 75.478 24.522 44.446 55.554 
11 85.993 14.007 14.095 85.906 74.547 25.453 45.609 54.391 
12 85.472 14.528 14.525 85.475 74.054 25.946 45.930 54.070 
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Table 9.  Variance decomposition for the wheat market  
 Pre-GATT GATT 
 U.S. Wheat Price 
Variability 
AU Wheat Price 
Variability 
U.S. Wheat Price 
Variability 
AU Wheat Price 
Variability 
 
Step 
U.S. 
Price 
AU 
Price 
U.S. 
Price 
AU 
Price 
U.S. 
Price 
AU 
Price 
U.S. 
Price 
AU 
Price 
1 100.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 100.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 
2 90.099 9.901 9.063 90.937 64.922 35.078 53.427 46.573 
3 84.401 15.599 10.788 89.212 64.763 35.237 53.493 46.507 
4 82.407 17.593 10.946 89.054 63.558 36.442 54.345 45.655 
5 82.288 17.712 10.971 89.029 63.723 36.277 54.591 45.409 
6 81.496 18.504 10.959 89.041 63.042 36.958 55.203 44.797 
7 80.401 19.599 14.196 85.804 63.490 36.510 55.668 44.332 
8 80.114 19.886 14.660 85.340 61.815 38.185 55.414 44.586 
9 80.271 19.729 15.952 84.048 59.155 40.845 54.550 45.450 
10 80.186 19.814 15.988 84.012 58.719 41.281 54.500 45.500 
11 80.325 19.675 16.381 83.619 58.567 41.433 53.773 46.227 
12 79.522 20.478 18.672 81.328 56.750 43.250 53.869 46.131 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Proportion of countries and final bound rate for beef in GATT. 
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Figure 2.  Share of Australian beef price innovation in the variance of U.S. beef price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Share of U.S. beef price innovation in the variance of Australian beef price. 
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Figure 4.  Share of Australian wheat price innovation in the variance of U.S. wheat price. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Share of U.S. wheat price innovation in the variance of Australian wheat price. 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
ABARE Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics 
ADF  Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
AMS  Aggregate Measure of Support 
CIF  cost of insurance and freight 
EU  European Union 
FAPRI  Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
MAV  Minimum Access Volume 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
OECD  Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
RATS  Regression Analysis of Time Series 
USDA  U.S. Department of Agriculture 
 
30  /  Fabiosa 
Institutional Impact of GATT  /  31 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
Benson, B.L., M.D. Faminow, M.H. Maquis, and D.G. Sauer.  (1994).  “The Impact of 
Provincial Marketing Boards on Price Relationships and Pricing Dynamics in North 
American Slaughter Hog Market.”  Applied Econometrics 26:677-88. 
 
Bewley, K., and D.G. Fiebeg.  (1989).  “Why Are Long-Run Parameter Estimates So 
Disparate?”  Discussion Paper No. 89/3.  University of New South Wales School of 
Economics. 
 
Borges, R.B.  (1995).  “Trade and the Political Economy of Agricultural Policy: The Case of the 
Unites States Peanut Program.”  Journal of Agriculture and Applied Economics 27(2):595-
612. 
 
Brester, G.W., and M.K. Wohlgenant.  (1997).  “Impacts of the GATT/Uruguay Round Trade 
Negotiations on U.S. Beef and Cattle Prices.”  Journal of Agriculture and Resource 
Economics 22(1):145-56. 
 
Campbell, J.Y., and P. Perron.  (1991).  “Pitfalls and Opportunities: What Macroeconomists 
Should Know About Unit Roots.”  NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991.  Cambridge: The 
MIT Press. 
 
Dickey, D.A., D.W. Jansen, and D.I. Thornton.  (1991).  A Primer on Cointegration with an 
Application to Money and Income.  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
Doan, T.A.  (1990).  RATS User's Manual Version 4. 
 
Engle, R.F., and C.W.J. Granger.  (1987).  “Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation, and Testing.”  Econometrica 55:251-76. 
 
Engle, R.F., D.F. Hendry, and J. Richard.  (1983) . “Exogeneity.”  Econometrica 51:277-305. 
 
Fausti, S.W., and B.A. Qasmi.  (1998).  The Effect of NAFTA on Trade in Agricultural Food 
Products.  Research Discussion Paper No. 13.  Trade Research Center, Montana State 
University. 
 
Fuller, F., and D. Hayes.  (1998).  The Impact of Chinese Accession to the World Trade 
Organization on U.S. Meat and Feed-Grain Producers.  Research Discussion Paper No. 16.  
Trade Research Center, Montana State University. 
 
32  /  Fabiosa 
Goodwin, B.K.  (1992).  “Multivariate Cointegration Tests and the Law of One Price: A 
Clarification and Correction.”  Review of Agricultural Economics 14:337-38. 
 
Goodwin, B.K., and T.J. Grennes.  (1994).  “Real Interest Rate Equalization and the Integration 
of International Financial Statistics.”  Journal of International Money and Finance, 13:107-
24. 
 
Granger, C.W.J.  (1969).  “Investigating Causal Relationships by Econometric Models and Cross 
Spectral Methods.”  Econometrica 37:424-38. 
 
Granger, C.W.J., and P. Newbold.  (1974).  “Spurious Regressions in Econometrics,”  Journal of 
Econometrics 2:111-20. 
 
Gunter, L.F., K.H. Jeong, and F.C. White. (1996).  “Multiple Policy Goals in Trade Model with 
Explicit Factor Market.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(2):313-30. 
 
Helmar, M., V. Premakumar, K. Oerter, J. Kruse, D.B. Smith, and W.H. Meyers.  (1994).  
Impacts of the Uruguay Round on Agricultural Commodity Markets.  Research paper 94-
GATT 21, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. 
 
Ingco, M.D.  (1995).  Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round: One Step 
Forward, One Step Back?  Supplementary paper for the Conference on the Uruguay Round 
and the Developing Economies.  International Trade Division, The World Bank. 
 
Johansen, S.  (1988).  “Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors.”  Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control 12:231-54. 
 
Marsh, J.M.  (1997).  GATT Policies and Effects on the U.S. Beef Market.  Research Discussion 
Paper No. 5.  Trade Research Center, Montana State University. 
 
McNew, K., and P.L. Fackler.  (1997).  Testing Market Equilibrium: Is Cointegration 
Informative?”  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 22(2):191-207. 
 
Miljkovic, D., G.W. Brester, and J.M. Marsh.  (1998).  Pricing to Market of U.S. Meat Exports. 
Research Discussion Paper No. 26.  Trade Research Center, Montana State University. 
 
Nelson and Plosser.  (1982).  Trends and Random Walks in Macroeconomic Time Series: Some 
Evidence and Implications.”  Journal of Monetary Economics 10:139-62. 
 
Oerter, K., M. Helmar, V. Premakumar, J. Kruse, D.B. Smith, and W.H. Meyers.  (1995).  
Impacts of the Uruguay Round on the World Rice Market.  Research paper 95-GATT 1.  
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. 
 
Institutional Impact of GATT  /  33 
Silvapulle, P., and S. Jayasuriya.  (1994).  “Testing for Philippine Rice Market Integration: A 
Multiple Cointegration Approach.”  Journal of Agricultural Economics 45:369-80. 
 
SAS Institute Inc.  (1993).  SAS/ETS User’s Guide.  Version 6, Second Edition.  Cary, NC: SAS 
Institute Inc. 
 
Song, J.H., and C.A. Carter.  (1996).  “Rice Trade Liberalization and Implications for U.S. 
Policy.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(4):891-905. 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Economic Research Service (ERS).  (1998).  Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture: The Record to Date.  Special article in the Agricultural Outlook. 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS).  (1998).  Livestock Annual 
Report.  Various countries and various issues. 
 
Veeman, M.  (1994).  “Implications of NAFTA and GATT for the Canadian Red Meat Sector.”  
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 42(4):473-83. 
 
World Trade Organization.  (1995).  Annual Report: International Bovine Meat Agreement.  
Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
